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Abstract 
This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment 
in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and 
‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational 
irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, 
bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters 
who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote 
is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive 
in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax 
revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and 
populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool 
with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the 
majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent 
politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and 
expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading 
uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and 
spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians 
may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of 
potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians 
have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter 
types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing 
in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the 
model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard. 
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1.  Introduction 
A crucial debate within Political Economics is the extent to which we can assume full 
rationality on the part of voters. Since Downs (1957), the concept of ‘rational 
ignorance’ has been a thorny problem to deal with. The idea is that given the very low 
probability of determining the outcome of an election, there is very little incentive for 
voters to become well-informed about the link between policy and outcomes. The 
concept of rational ignorance became an important component of the ‘Virginia 
School’ of public choice. In, for example, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) the idea of 
voters having great difficulty holding politicians to account became a key contribution 
to their emphasis on democratic inefficiency and the importance of constitutionally 
set fiscal restraints. Voters may suffer from ‘fiscal illusion’ or they may not be 
cognisant of ‘sneaky transfers’ to interest groups (Tullock 1983). 
 This led to a response by the ‘Chicago School’, particularly by Wittman (1989, 
1995). He attempts to dismiss concerns regarding voter irrationality and argues that 
democratic institutions are, in fact, efficient. He recognised the fact that individual 
voters are insignificant and that this could lead to individual biases away from what 
the voter would understand to be correct policy if they were fully informed. But 
overall, we should expect individual biases to cancel out. In addition, if voters are 
being fooled why would we expect this to persist over time?  To a large extent 
Wittman was confronting an issue that many political economists had already 
assumed away. The vast majority of papers in political economics do not worry about 
the implications of voter insignificance and assume full voter rationality. Nonetheless, 
while Wittman’s contention that a strong version of rationality should be assumed 
would generally meet with vigorous approval within the economics profession, the 
emphasis on the efficiency of democracy would not find common consent. Surveys 
such as Rodrik (1996), Robinson (1998) and Besley (2006, chapter 2) present various 
explanations for the existence of democratic inefficiency. But, where inefficiency 
does seem clearly to exist the source of the problem should not be identified as related 
to voter rationality but rather as the equilibrium outcome of the political game played 
between strategic agents (or groups of agents).1 This point is made very forcefully by 
                                                 
1 The identification of inefficiency does not imply that it can be eliminated. A debate can be entered as 
to whether a seeming inefficiency is actually constrained efficient given the various transaction costs 
that may exist and thus whether there is actually any possibility of efficiency enhancing institutional 
change. 
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Rodrik (1996) who after surveying rational models of bad macroeconomic policy 
writes ‘they confirm that we can do better than resort to myopia or irrationality when 
explaining social phenomena’ (p.25).2 
Modern political economics has progressed with the construction of models of 
electoral competition and political agency without having the waters muddied by 
capricious voter behaviour. Models of electoral competition are open to the criticism 
that campaign promises are cheap talk and political agency models emerged from the 
perspective that voters instead decide to vote on the basis of incumbent performance 
rather then electoral promises. It is within the latter class of models (in political 
agency) that this paper will lie and Besley (2006) has provided a comprehensive 
overview of this area of political economics. In these models voters base their 
decision on the performance of the incumbent, so voting is retrospective and voters 
update their beliefs regarding the quality of the incumbent according to Bayes Rule. 
The voters are highly rational. Political agency models deal primarily with valence 
issues that all voters would agree on, such as efficient use of taxpayers’ money, in 
contrast to distributional battles over tax and spending bundles where preferences are 
determined by, for example, voter’s income. This emphasis on efficiency allows the 
basic political agency model to ignore distributional struggles and as a consequence 
voter heterogeneity.  
In the baseline political agency approach a two-period model is utilised to explore 
issues which relate to moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard relates to the 
discipline effect. Can a low quality incumbent (either in terms of competence or 
character) be persuaded to give up rents and provide voters with good policy? The 
incentive to do so is to retain power and enjoy full rents (through poor policy) in the 
second period. Adverse selection relates to the selection effect. By exposing a low 
quality incumbent, there is a positive probability that a randomly drawn challenger 
will be of high quality and provide good policy in the second period. As such, the 
discipline and selection effects are offsetting. Besley (2006) surveys myriad 
extensions that have been made to this basic model. 
This paper will pick up on one of these extensions. Besley devotes a section to 
models of pandering/populism. In the baseline model it is the low quality incumbent 
                                                 
2 Examples of papers that attempt to provide fully informed, rational explanations for socially 
undesirable fiscal deficits are Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). 
Examples of papers which attempt to account for inefficient redistribution are Coate and Morris (1995) 
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001). 
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who faces the decision whether to behave well or not. Besley labels these politicians 
‘dissonant’ as their preferences are not aligned with the interests of the general public. 
The high quality incumbent is ‘congruent’ because they are rewarded for doing the 
right thing which is their desire in any case as their interests are aligned with those of 
the general public. In reality though voters do not always seem to vote their interests 
and in this situation it is the good politician who would face a dilemma. Does she give 
the voters what they want (but which is not in their interests) in order to do the right 
thing in the second period or do the right thing today and risk not being re-elected and 
allowing the possibility of a bad politician taking charge in the second period?  
This style of problem has been explored in Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 
(2001), Morris (2001) and Maskin and Tirole (2004). These papers do not deviate 
from the assumption that voters are fully rational and Bayesian and as a result they 
emerge with what are arguably quite complicated stories as to why we might observe 
populism. For example in Maskin and Tirole the idea is that voters decide that a 
certain policy is one that would be enacted by a bad politician (based on experience) 
and vote against it. A good incumbent discovers that this policy is, in fact, one that is 
in the interests of voters but in order to be re-elected must implement the inefficient, 
but popular, policy instead. But this perspective of pandering/populism does not seem 
to gel with the general use of those terms in popular publications such as the 
Economist.3 When used in journalistic articles by economic commentators, 
‘populism’ would tend to identify policies that virtually all economists would 
recognise as bad. For example, in macroeconomic policy this could be excessively 
large budget deficits and inflationary finance. In microeconomic policy, it could be 
excessive protectionism and other market interventions that create deadweight losses 
which are hard to justify on grounds of equity. Outside economics, populism is a word 
often invoked in the context of policies of aggression where communities or countries 
are in conflict. The more efficient, but non-popular policy approach would more often 
be to work towards peace. So the modern use of the word populism is more often used 
in a derogatory fashion and refers to the implementation of policies that are popular 
but almost invariably bad.4 If such populism is common, the theoretical problem is 
                                                 
3 See for example ‘The return of populism’, The Economist, April 12, 2006. 
4 There is, of course, a different use of the term ‘populism’ in the sense that it stands for movements of 
the people standing up to powerful elites (see Canovan 1999 and the Economist cited above). This 
perspective treats populism as a term related to distributional conflict and zero-sum outcomes. The 
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that this would really seem to suggest that a degree of irrationality exists that cannot 
easily be dismissed through the construction of models that would explain such 
policies as the equilibrium of a game played between fully rational actors but where 
the collective outcome is inefficient. Some policies are supported where if the voters 
were playing a best response we should really expect them to oppose them given the 
effect of these policies on voter welfare.   
 But is voting of this sort actually irrational? Perhaps, in a hard sense of the word it 
is but in a much weaker sense there is a very strong argument that would suggest that 
it is not irrational. This paper greatly simplifies the analysis of populism by 
resurrecting the idea of rational ignorance as explored and extended in Caplan (2002, 
2007). Caplan extends the idea of rational ignorance to develop the idea of ‘rational 
irrationality’. A crucial finding in Caplan’s empirical work is that citizens untrained in 
economics have systematically biased beliefs with respect to citizens trained in 
economics. He argues that these biases can be seen in four main areas – anti-market 
bias, anti-foreign bias, make-work bias and pessimistic bias. He argues that they hold 
these biases because people desire beliefs and very often these beliefs may run 
contrary to evidence. Consider, for example, the belief in creationism. Beliefs are a 
normal good and when their price is low demand for them will be high. The price will 
be low in situations where if the individual were to alter their belief it would make no 
or little difference to their material existence.  In democratic elections the probability 
of being decisive is extremely low and as a result changing beliefs is very unlikely to 
make any difference to the outcome of the election and as a result the life of the 
individual voter. Furthermore there is, in addition, no incentive to even become 
acquainted with evidence that would suggest that there is an alternative and more 
accurate view of the world than the one they currently hold. Rational irrational voters 
do not possess information that would conflict with their belief system as they have 
no incentive to acquire it.  
 Note that rational irrationality differs from rational ignorance in that an ignorant 
voter cannot be presumed to have a particular opinion. There was no role within 
rational ignorance for a demand for beliefs. A rationally irrational voter, on the other 
hand, has an opinion (often very strongly held) because there is a role for a demand 
for beliefs. When the majority of voters hold biases such as those identified by Caplan 
                                                                                                                                            
derogatory use of the term populism, as used in this paper, implies inefficiency and negative-sum 
outcomes.  
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it provides a fairly direct rule of thumb for which policies incumbents should enact 
should they wish to be re-elected. This allows for the common sense understanding of 
populism as an identifiable policy package that we define as always inferior and one 
which fully rational, instrumentally motivated voters would never select.5  
 A criticism of the model to be developed in this paper is that it will simply turn the 
discipline and selection effects upside down and in a way which is much less 
sophisticated than the aforementioned political agency literature on populism which 
still holds to full rationality and Bayesian updating. While this might be true if we 
allowed for a simple binary choice of policy (good or bad) as is the norm in the 
political agency literature, we instead try and capture a more realistic depiction of 
policy choice and assume that it is continuous and that there is an option for the 
incumbent to engage in public education of good policy. This introduces a novel 
perspective to both the seriousness of the inefficiency (for example protectionism, 
fiscal deficits and violent conflict are not generally either/or issues but rather issues of 
how much) and to the ways in which government can send signals. One way in which 
a government can send signals is to engage in costly acts of public education or 
persuasion regarding the nature of good policy. Romer (2003) forcefully makes the 
point that education is very important when bad policy is caused by misconceptions. 
If the source of inefficiency in a model is held to be unrelated to misconceptions then 
clearly education would be irrelevant because the voters are already fully informed. 
Like Caplan, Romer argues that misconceptions are real, widespread and thus form a 
major contribution towards bad policy. As an appeal to the reality of biases both 
Caplan and Romer point to the clear biases that university students arrive with and 
which teachers in economics and many other subjects try to correct. Romer 
emphasises that biases also exist at the higher and perhaps more worrying level of 
public officialdom and policy-makers. 
 The model will be further enriched by the presence of expressive voters. These are 
close cousins of Caplan’s rational irrational voters but there is a crucial difference. In 
the latter, voters hold beliefs but these beliefs are challenged by the voter possessing 
an understanding that their beliefs may be wrong. So, for example, voters who 
consider themselves protectionist may change their mind when they understand the 
law of comparative advantage. Expressive voters as presented in Brennan and 
                                                 
5 An important question that remains to be answered is where does the bias come from? 
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Lomasky (1993) are fully informed but they may not vote their instrumental interest 
because they know their vote is unlikely to affect the outcome of the election. If 
expressive voters define themselves as protectionist or religious fundamentalists, an 
understanding that protectionism or religious fundamentalism is not their in their 
instrumental interests may have no effect upon their voting for protectionist or 
fundamentalist positions for the very reason that these voters understand that their 
vote entails no instrumental consequence. The extent to which voters are expressive is 
important in determining the effect of information provision in converting voters 
towards supporting better policies and we will argue that the extent of conversion is 
also influenced by how radical is the policy change proposal.6 We label both types of 
voter ‘emotional’ and the extent to which these emotional voters are rationally 
irrational or expressive is central to the analysis. We also hope this richer depiction of 
voter’s types and motivations goes some way to meeting a challenge set by Besley 
(2006) to incorporate behavioural approaches into political agency modelling. “Going 
forward it would be interesting to understand better what the differences are between 
behavioral models of politics and the postulates of strict rationality supposed here. It 
would be useful to understand when simple and sensible behavioral rules lead to 
large policy distortions.” (Besley 2006: 172).7 
 As an explanation for inefficient policies, the depiction of emotional voting in this 
paper should be viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for analyses that 
assume full instrumental rationality and which focus instead on strategic interaction as 
the source of inefficiency. Consider Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) discussion of 
inefficient redistribution. They focus on the inability to form binding commitments as 
the trigger which leads interest groups to seek transfers inefficiently through market 
interventions rather than efficiently through cash transfers. Political power comes 
with maintaining large numbers and inefficient transfers keeps current and future 
members in the interest group whereas with cash transfers membership of the interest 
group would decline over time and thus the group would weaken and with it the 
group’s ability to extract transfers. Therefore, inefficient transfers are in the material 
                                                 
6 This depiction of expressive voting is a negative one. In section 3 an alternative depiction of 
expressive voting will be used which is positive. It is based on Brennan and Hamlin (1999) which 
focuses on voters selecting politicians on the basis of their moral attributes. 
7 A paper that attempts to amend the standard model of electoral competition for an environment in 
which voting is expressive is Brennan and Hamlin (1998). This paper could be viewed as a similar 
attempt to amend the standard model of political agency to incorporate expressive voting. 
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self-interest of the members of the interest group. They apply the model to 
agricultural, labour market and trade policies.  
 While this is a theory that would explain a significant fraction of the support for 
inefficient transfers (namely the members of the recipient group), it also the case that 
such policies are often supported by a further group of voters who are not members of 
the interest group and who are actually hurt by such policies. These are the sorts of 
voters who appear in this paper and it is unlikely that these ‘emotional’ voters would 
find cash transfers to interest groups emotionally appealing. Further, it seems likely 
that where an inefficient policy appears to receive a very large level of support it 
would seem likely that a large proportion of those supporters are not material 
beneficiaries of the policy. Evidence for both types of support for protectionism is 
found in Mayda and Rodrik (2003). In addition to finding support for protectionism 
from those groups that benefit from it (given the absence of institutional arrangements 
which would provide for a Pareto superior distribution of surplus), they also find that 
‘protectionist attitudes go together with a well-defined set of normative attributes. 
Individuals who favor trade restrictions tend to have high attachments to their 
neighborhood and community, have a high degree of national pride, and believe that 
national interest should be paramount in making trade-offs.’ (p.1395) From the 
perspective of this paper an interesting issue is whether this desire for protectionism 
would persist if these voters were placed in a position where their beliefs could 
impinge on their material welfare such as being decisive in determining the outcome 
of an election. Clearly the support of large numbers of emotional voters who are 
actually made worse-off by inefficient transfers greatly increases the power of the 
recipient group. The same sort of analysis might also be applied to conflict, where 
group identity may provide a source of emotional attachment which provides the 
large-scale political support essential for the much smaller group of agents who 
actually do benefit materially from the conflict. Again, we might conjecture that such 
support would be greatly reduced if the supporters found themselves in a position 
where their support would be decisive in determining whether their group would 
engage in conflict or not.8 So a key implication is that inefficient policies that 
                                                 
8 In the case of bad macroeconomic policy, it would seem more difficult to invoke ‘emotional’ voting 
as a reason for supporting an irresponsible budget deficit. Myopia would, in fact, seem a more plausible 
explanation. Nonetheless, myopia does make rational sense when it is recognised that the incentive to 
be economically well-informed is extremely low when economic outcomes are determined as the 
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generate emotional attachment (such as nationalism or more generally factionalism of 
various kinds) have a greater chance of success as they would attract large levels of 
support both from the relatively small group of individuals who materially benefit 
from the policy and a relatively large group of individuals who do not. If an interest 
group can present their cause as emotionally appealing they would be placed in a 
much stronger political position.  
 In the next section we outline the basic model. We introduce the setting of the 
game; we outline the strategies and payoffs for the politicians and voters and outline 
the timing of the game. We distinguish between three types of politician; the good, 
bad and populist and discuss in detail the motivation of voters. We start by assuming 
there are no ‘bad’ politicians and focus on three possible options for incumbent good 
politicians – to choose good policy, populist policy, or somewhere in between through 
education of the public. The welfare effects of these strategies are analyzed and the 
conditions under which they may emerge are explored. Section 3 restores bad 
politicians to the analysis and argues that some potential badness is potentially 
welfare-improving ex ante and we look at a possible strategy which allows good and 
populist politicians to separate from bad ones. Section 4 offers some concluding 
comments. 
 
2.  The Model 
The Setting  – We suppose that there is a policy PS that generates an inefficient social 
outcome but for the reasons discussed in the introduction and further elaborated upon 
below would be favoured by the majority of voters. As discussed, this could relate to 
policies such as heavy protectionism or other deadweight loss creating interventions 
that would be very hard to justify on equity grounds. In macroeconomic policy it 
could be an excessively large budget deficit or the policy could be one of pursuing a 
destructive war. Alternatively, (and more in keeping with the Maskin and Tirole 
(2004) set-up) the policy could be the status quo approach that was appropriate in the 
past but exogenous shocks have occurred that render this policy approach currently 
inefficient. PS is intended to cover a very broad range of potential inefficient social 
policies.  
                                                                                                                                            
outcome of democratic elections. Later we shall see that where bad policy is associated with weak 
emotional attachment, the potential for welfare improving policy is greatly increased.  
 10
 The incumbent government is assumed to have access to information which 
instructs it as to best policy P*. Policy is depicted as continuous and increasing from 
PS to P* such that voter welfare (W) is maximised at P* where a range of policies 
could be debated as reasonable maximisations of W.9 PS may differ depending on the 
jurisdiction, but the further PS is from P* the greater the initial inefficiency. Welfare is 
increasing in P so .  We may normally expect that slight moves away from 
PS  towards P* may bring relatively big returns that diminish as policy moves towards 
P* so that W P
( )'W P >
0
0
( )'' < . We assume that there is a maximum level of tax revenue T that 
it would be possible for the incumbent government to appropriate. 
 
Politicians – There are three types of politician; good, bad and populist. Let π  be the 
probability that a randomly picked politician is good, κ that she is bad and 1 π κ− −  
that she is populist. The objectives of these politicians differ. We will start by 
identifying their objective if they were only to be in power for one period and did not 
face re-election incentives. In a two-period model this also, of course, identifies the 
behaviour of the politicians were they to be in power in the second period. 
 All politicians are assumed to receive an ego rent E from being in power. The good 
politician is concerned with maximising W so would select P* and receive a payoff W* 
+ E. The bad politician (and we mean morally bad rather than incompetent) is 
motivated to steal tax revenue for personal gain, so would simply steal T and receive 
payoff T + E. The populist is concerned only with being approved by a majority of 
the electorate. Clearly the populist would never steal but will wish to set whichever 
policy is most popular even when he knows it is not welfare-maximising. His payoff 
to being in power is assumed to be E.  As we shall see the politicians may be forced to 
trade-off maximising their single period objective in order to achieve re-election. In 
this section of the paper we will assume that 0κ =  so that there are only good and 
populist politicians. We will relax this assumption in section 3. 
                                                 
9 Trained social scientists obviously disagree over the appropriate level of protectionism and other 
market interventions such as the minimum wage, the appropriate level for budget deficits, whether 
violent conflict is on some occasions the correct response to a perceived threat and so on. The point 
made here is that the policy debate amongst experts is very likely to have a much smaller variance than 
the debate between non-experts and more importantly that the mean opinion is very often (as in 
Caplan’s finding) sharply different between the two groups. So for convenience P* can be viewed as 
covering the mean policy that would be recommended by the well-informed although we recognise 
disagreement amongst this group, whereas PS can be viewed as the mean policy that would be 
recommended by the non-informed. 
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 Voters – We allow for heterogeneous voters. We assume that ω are well informed and 
1 – ω are rationally irrational. The well informed voters correctly understand the link 
between policy and outcomes so that they know that P* maximises their welfare. They 
are not informed about the identity of the incumbent, but they understand that 
politicians may behave strategically and based upon the behaviour of the incumbent 
politician they update their beliefs as to her identity and use this updated information 
when making their decision to re-elect or not. The rationally irrational voters 
misunderstand the link between policy and outcomes and believe that PS maximises 
their welfare. Their voting strategy is simple. They re-elect if the incumbent politician 
implements PS and will vote for the challenger if the incumbent does otherwise. 
Rationally irrational voters are thus depicted as using a basic rule of thumb with bias. 
They do not consider the implications as to why a politician may choose an unpopular 
policy. The justification for assuming this kind of voting behaviour is that rationally 
irrational voters are not likely to devote much time to considering the political 
strategy of politicians and the reason why they do not is that their vote is very unlikely 
to be decisive. Well-informed voters understand that their vote is also unlikely to be 
decisive, but they became informed about the merits of policy because they were well 
educated or followed political and economic issues out of personal interest. Rationally 
irrational voters would become better informed about the link between policy and 
welfare if they were to be educated about it. 
 As discussed in the introduction we also allow for expressive voting. Recall that 
expressive voting is compatible with being well-informed. Voters may experience an 
inner conflict or tension such that the policy that they know would be in their 
instrumental interest does not hold a strong expressive appeal. In situations of 
decisiveness we may be justified in ignoring expressive preferences as we would 
expect voters to choose their material interests given that they are more likely to be 
concerned about this than any expressive loss that they may experience. So, for 
example, if a voter is decisive and understands the law of comparative advantage we 
might expect them to choose free trade rather than protectionism, or peace rather than 
war although emotionally protectionism and war may be more appealing to them. But 
since in most voting scenarios the probability of being decisive is very low, the price 
of choosing expressively is also very low such that well-informed voters may vote for 
protectionism or war even though these are policies that they actually know (if they 
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were being completely honest with themselves) would not be in their material 
interests. 
 Some might find that the idea of expressively voting for policy X when the voter 
knows that Y is better is a rather strong assumption. A weaker version would be that 
the voter ex post rationalises that X is better than Y to suit the emotional attachment to 
X. As Westen (2007) writes ‘what passes for reasoning in politics is more often 
rationalization, motivated by efforts to reason to emotionally satisfying conclusions.’ 
(p. xi). Is rationalization of emotional beliefs compatible with expressive voting? How 
is this different to rationally irrational voting? An expressive voter might say that 
policy X is best (although Y is in fact best), but in reality they really know Y is best 
but their insignificance in democratic participation does not force them to be 
confronted with any consequence from denying the truth. In contrast, a rationally 
irrational voter actually does believe X is best as they have successfully avoided 
processing information that would lead them to understand the truth that Y is a 
superior policy, even if this is a truth they would subsequently attempt to rationalize 
away. 
 To formalise this we assume that all voters have a level of emotional, expressive 
attachment r maximised at PS which is distributed across all voters on [ ]0, R . Those 
with  at PS experience an expressive attachment to PS and those with  do 
not. As P moves from PS those with an expressive attachment experience an 
expressive loss, whereas those with no expressive attachment do not. For the attached 
voters  and for the unattached voters 
0r >
r P
0=r
( )' < 0 '( ) 0r P = . Since r is decreasing in P 
for the attached voters it’s value may at some point turn negative over the range 
. This will be especially so for voters with . These voters could be 
viewed as zealots, holding a very strong attachment to PS such that any deviation from 
it causes them a relatively large reduction in expressive value. Only well-informed 
voters may experience internal tension with movements away from PS.   
*,P PS⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ''(r P) 0>
 Rationally irrational voters experience no tension between their expressive and 
instrumental preferences as they believe PS is also best policy. We formalise their 
voting strategy as follows. We assume that rationally irrational voters have in their 
mind a benchmark for ideal policy which is some combination of expressive concerns 
and welfare concerns( )r P ( )j W . They believe that this is optimised at 
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(( )Sr P j W+ )S . If an alternative policy is implemented (without explanation) they 
will believe this to be inferior as shown by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )S S Sr P j W r P P j W W+ > ≠ + ≠ S  (1) 
We assume that ( )r P  is invariant to education, but ( )j W would be revised in the 
light of new information. 
 
Timing - Nature determines the type of politician who then picks their preferred 
action. The incumbent is either re-elected or if the challenger wins nature determines 
the type of second period leader. The incumbent has the option to choose as part of 
policy a campaign of costly public education. We assume that voters observe the 
action but the revelation of the payoff is delayed until after the next election. The 
second period incumbent chooses their preferred action and at the end of the second 
period the game ends. 
  
Equilibrium – In period 2 the politicians do not face re-election so the good politician 
will choose P* which generates voter welfare W*. The populist simply wants to be 
popular with a majority of the voters and will select PS. The dilemma facing the good 
politician is which policy should be selected in period 1. They will be tempted to 
choose the populist position PS in order to be re-elected although this means 
sacrificing welfare W* for WS. Alternatively, they could choose P* and optimise first 
period voter welfare, but thus accept defeat in the election and hope that the 
challenger who defeated them is a good politician. A key idea here is that any policy 
other than PS will be defeated. 
 Given that we have well-informed voters ω  and rationally irrational voters 1 ω− , 
it does not follow automatically that PS is a guaranteed election winning policy. We 
now need to demonstrate the conditions for this to be the case. Note that 1 ω−  of the 
voters are rationally irrational and believe PS to be best policy. If presented with a 
policy of PS they will vote for the incumbent. Clearly if 1 1 2ω− >  then populist 
policy is guaranteed to win. We do not wish to limit the paper to this case, so we need 
to analyse the case where 1 1 2ω− <  and 1 2ω − votes will need to be won from the 
set ω of well-informed voters to ensure that PS has majority support and that any other 
policy would fail to obtain majority support.   
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 There are three scenarios that need to be considered. The first two stem from a 
common knowledge amongst well-informed voters that the good politician would 
separate from the populist and implement a different 1st period policy to PS. We will 
demonstrate the conditions required for this to be the optimal action for the good 
politician later. In this scenario, two cases arise 
1) the incumbent is a populist and PS wins the election. 
2) the incumbent is good and SP P≠ loses the election. 
The third case is where it is common knowledge among well-informed voters that a 
good politician would pool with a populist and choose PS. Again, the conditions 
required for this to be the optimal action for the good politician will be discussed 
later. 
 3) the incumbent could be good or populist and PS wins the election. 
We now discuss each of the three scenarios in turn 
1: Populist Incumbent and PS wins the election 
The populist implementing PS wins the 1 ω−  votes of the rationally irrational. In 
order to secure a majority they need to win a proportion 1 2ω ω
−  of the votes of the 
well-informed. A well-informed voter i has to weigh up the payoff of voting for the 
populist incumbent given by 
 ( ) ( )i S Sr P h W+  (2) 
versus voting for the challenger where the payoff is given by 
 ( )( )* 1 Sh W Wπ π+ −  (3) 
Pay-off (2) tells us that for those voters that experience  there is a positive 
expressive attachment to the populist policy, but that must be weighed against the 
potential for deciding the outcome of the election with probability h and incurring the 
instrumental payoff of WS. Payoff (3) tells us that there is no expressive attachment to 
a challenger who has not implemented policy, but the instrumental payoff is greater 
than WS as with positive probability the challenger may turn out to be a good 
politician. In the standard political agency analysis where there is no expressive 
voting and voting is assumed to be decisive, the challenger would win all the votes of 
the well-informed voters. The assumption that there is no expressive voting seems 
reasonable when voters are assumed decisive. In this case we could justifiably argue 
that emotional attachment to policies that are in the past are of trivial significance 
0r >
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compared to the material interests of voters in the future and thus it makes sense to 
ignore the former. The problem, as should be clear by now, is that voting is only 
going to be decisive with a probability of h and this greatly reduces the importance of 
future instrumental welfare for well-informed voters when making their voting 
decision. The role of the expressive component in voting increases as h approaches 0.  
 A well-informed voter i will vote for the populist incumbent rather than the 
challenger if 
 ( ) ( )*i S Sr P h W Wπ> −  (4) 
If 1 2ω ω
−  of the well-informed voters satisfy (4) then populism implemented by a 
known populist wins. Clearly this case is more easily satisfied the closer ω  is to 1 2 , 
the closer h is to  0 and that there is a sufficient number of well-informed voters with 
a sufficiently strong expressive attachment to produce the necessary majority for 
populist policy. 
2: Good Incumbent and loses the election SP P≠
In this case the 1 ω−  votes of the rationally irrational have been lost due to 
selecting . In order to win the election the good politician will need to attract at 
least 
SP P≠
1 2
ω  of the well-informed votes. A well-informed voter i has to weigh up the 
payoff of voting for the good incumbent given by 
 ( ) ( )*i Sr P P h W≠ +  (5) 
versus voting for the challenger where the payoff is given by (3). For the challenger to 
win this election and thus lead to the electoral defeat of any deviation from PS, then 
the following must be true for at least 1 21 ω−  of the well-informed group of voters 
 ( )( ) ( )*1 Sh W W r Pπ− − > ≠ SP  (6) 
These voters must experience sufficiently large expressive losses from any deviation 
from PS such that the selection of any policy other than PS will result in the loss of the 
election. Clearly this is more likely to hold the closer ω  is to ½, the closer h is to 0 
and the greater the number of well-informed voters that are zealots so that they 
experience falls in expressive benefits so sharp that it becomes negative with any 
small deviation from PS. 
3: Both Populist and Good Politicians choose PS and win 
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The final case is where it is common knowledge among the well-informed voters that 
the good politician will pool with the populist and choose PS. In this case, on 
observing PS the payoff to voting for the incumbent is ( )Sr P . There is no 
instrumental difference in voting for the incumbent or the challenger as nothing is 
learnt regarding the true identity of the incumbent when the good politician takes this 
policy action. In this case, all rational irrational voters will vote for the incumbent and 
if we assume that well-informed voters who are indifferent because they have 
either vote for the incumbent or abstain then implementing PS will win the 
election.
( ) 0Sr P =
10 
 The dominant strategy for the populist is to select PS in both periods. We will focus 
for the remainder of this section on the choices facing an incumbent good politician.  
The good politician will maximise voter welfare W* in period 2. In period 1 they face 
three possible options. First, they can implement a populist policy and be re-elected. 
Alternatively, they can implement good policy and lose the election. Finally, they can 
take an incremental approach and implement a policy better than the populist one but 
where the superiority of changes from populist policy have to be explained to the 
section of the electorate that is not well-informed, namely the 1 ω−  that are rationally 
irrational. Due to information costs policy may not reach the welfare maximising 
level and is labelled PI generating voter welfare . IW
 Information costs are depicted as the sum of two components. The first component 
 is the cost involved in explaining why changes in policy towards P* are for the 
benefit of rationally irrational voters. We assume that 
( )PI
( ) 0' >PI  and . This 
reflects the idea that it becomes increasingly costly to educate individuals to see that a 
policy is bad the closer that policy is to the optimum. 
( ) 0'' >PI
  is the cost of constructing the message, the second component is the cost of 
spreading the message to secure majority support. We assume that a government 
information campaign is less costly the less citizens are required to receive the 
message. Ideally the government would like to target the message so that it is only 
( )PI
                                                 
10 To state that PS is the populist policy requires the three conditions above to hold. If there were 
another winning policy that the good politician could implement when separating from the populist 
which is closer to P* then this would clearly dominate winning the election by choosing to pool with 
the populist. This also allows us to state that when the good politician separates and thus knows that 
this will result in electoral failure their best strategy is to implement policy P*. 
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received by those who are not already well-informed. The problem is that the 
government may be unable to identify the well-informed group so some of their 
message will be wasted as it is received by well-informed voters. This increases the 
number of citizens that will need to be contacted. Once expressive concerns are 
included in the analysis, the cost of spreading the message further increases. As we 
have seen for movements from PS some well-informed voters will vote for the 
challenger because they have experienced an expressive loss that outweighs the 
instrumental benefit of voting for the good incumbent. Given that these voters will 
vote for the challenger the number of citizens that need to be contacted further 
increases. Finally, as rationally irrational voters are contacted and are convinced that 
is superior to PS, they will also discover whether they experience an 
expressive loss from being pulled away from PS. For some the expressive loss will be 
sufficiently large that they will vote for the challenger. This, in turn, increases the 
number of citizens required to receive the message and create a majority.  
SP P≠
 We can formalise the preceding discussion by labelling the cost of spreading the 
message d such that 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 1
1 1
P
d t
P
λ ω
ω ϕ
⎛ ⎞− −= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
 (7) 
 Clearly the smaller is ω  the greater the number of uninformed voters that will need 
to be persuaded regarding improvement in policy. The term ( )Pλ  captures the well-
informed voters with strong enough expressive preferences that they would instead 
vote for the challenger as policy deviates from PS as in (6). Likewise,  captures 
rationally irrational voters with strong enough expressive attachment that they would 
vote for the challenger despite accepting the fact that 
( )Pϕ
( )SW P (W P )SP≠ > . For this 
to be the case, it must be that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )S W PS Sr P r P P− ≠ > Sh W P −P≠ . The 
term t is a general term that captures modes of information provision such as media 
outlets, the education system and also importantly willingness to listen to the 
message. 
  The cost function is therefore ( ) ( )( ), , ,C c I P d P tω= and the good politician 
will invest in information until W c I c d
P I P d P
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . The good politician will have 
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no incentive to invest in information if S S
W c I c d
P I P d PS
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂< +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . Investment in 
information will not be worthwhile if the marginal benefit is less than the marginal 
cost at . This may happen if  is close to SP SP *P  which reduces the marginal benefit 
and increases education costs ( )P'I . This condition could also be driven by low ω , 
relatively high values of  and ( )P'λ ( )' Pϕ  and a high level of t. Each (or a 
combination) of these factors may cause the cost of information provision to be 
prohibitive.11  
 The incentive to choose populism or information over good policies is driven by 
the existence of higher payoffs in period 2 to compensate for losses in period 1. To 
choose a populist policy in preference to a good one it must be that 
( ) ( ( ) )* 1S SE W W Wβ β π+ + + −* *E W> +E W+ π+  
this reduces to 
( )( )* 1SWE Wβ β βπ> − +  (8) −
Therefore, if the future is relatively important, that there is a low probability of being 
replaced by a good politician and that the gap between good and populist social 
welfare is not too large then populism will be the preferred strategy. Significantly, if 
we were also to assume that good politicians have no interest in ego rents then they 
would produce good policy. 
 However, the good politician may be able to do better than simply choosing the 
populist policy. Through provision of information they may be able to move to higher 
levels of voter welfare until marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of information 
at IP . An informational strategy is preferred to a populist strategy if 
( ) ( ) ( )* *I SE W E Wβ β+ + + + + +C− I E W E W>  
this reduces to 
( )CI S− >W W I  (9)  
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Caplan (2007) argues that the rationally irrational will actively avoid hearing messages that conflict 
with their beliefs. Formally this could be captured through a prohibitively high level of t. This paper 
allows for a more optimistic perspective regarding the absorption of information provision.  
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Welfare  
Proposition 1  Populism selected in period 1 by both types of political actor is 
unambiguously inferior from an ex ante welfare perspective. The welfare implication 
of an informational strategy is ex ante ambiguous. 
 
Here we compare the welfare effect of good politicians choosing a good policy versus 
choosing a populist strategy in period 1 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* 2 * *1 1 1S S S SW W W W W W W Wπ π β π π π π β π π+ − + + − + − > + + −1 S
which yields 
  (10) * SW W>
The improvement in selection of politicians in period 2 is insufficient to compensate 
for the distorted discipline shown in period 1. 
 Now we compare the welfare effect of good politicians choosing to invest in 
information provision. This will only be done where the improvement in voter welfare 
outweighs the cost of persuading the public ( ) 0I SW W C I− − > . Welfare from 
choosing good policy will be higher if  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 * *
*
1
1 1
11
S
S I S
SS
W W W
W W W W
WW
π π π ππ π β π π β ππ
⎛ ⎞+ − ⎛ ⎞+ − + > + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + −+ − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
which yields 
 ( ) ( )( )* * 1I SW W W Wπ βπ π− > − −  (11) 
Now the welfare effect is ambiguous. If information costs are very low then will 
be close to in which case welfare is improved through information provision. In 
this case, the improved selection effect in period 2 does compensate for the distorted 
discipline in period 1. 
IW
*W
 
Proposition 2  A necessary condition for populism to be implemented in period 1 is 
that (8) holds. This implies that either the future is relatively important and/or  is 
close to 
SP
*P  and/or ego rents are relatively high and/or π  is relatively low. Populism 
will be preferred to an informational strategy if ( )C I− <I SW W . This implies that 
either  is relatively close to  and/or SP *P ( )IC is relatively high.  
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Many issues are raised here. A first point that might be made is that populism as the 
pooling strategy in period 1 may not be a major cause for concern. This is the case 
where  is relatively close toSP *P . Much more worrying is where *P  and  are far 
apart and populism is still the strategy selected by a good politician. This can be 
driven by large ego rents, a lack of good politicians and costly information provision 
driven by a dearth of well-informed voters, the existence of a large number of 
strongly expressive voters and weak media outlets. Finally, even when an information 
strategy is pursued it will be the case that welfare would have been higher under a 
good policy if  is large. We might also comment on how the sources of 
inefficiency may differ in terms of the emotional attachment they generate. For 
example, we may expect the myopia associated with supporting large budget deficits 
to be more amenable to the provision of information than policies such as 
protectionism or overinvestment in defence as these latter policies are often 
inextricably linked to nationalist sentiment. The latter set of policies would more 
likely generate high levels of 
SP
* IW W−
( )Pλ  and ( )Pϕ . This does not mean that bad 
macroeconomic policy is necessarily easier to solve than protectionism. The cost of 
information provision depends also upon ω  and . t
 
3.  Including ‘Bad’ Politicians   
In this section we will relax the assumption that 0κ =  and allow for the possibility 
that bad politicians exist. As with good politicians, bad politicians need to weigh up 
the benefit to them of extracting rents in period 1 versus providing vote-winning 
policy in period 1 and delaying the extraction of rents until period 2. They will choose 
to extract rents today and accept electoral defeat at the end of period 1 if 
 ( )T Eβ> +T  (12) 
otherwise they would prefer to provide election winning policy in the period 1 and 
extract rents in period 2. We consider each in turn. 
 
3.1 The bad politician prefers to extract rents in period 1 and lose the election 
That (12) holds is assumed to be well known by well-informed voters. We now 
expand the expressive component of the well-informed voter’s utility function to 
incorporate the morality (or otherwise) of the incumbent politician. We do this by 
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expanding  to include a further term m such that ( )r P { , }m B NB=  where B stands 
for bad and NB stands for not bad. For a given P, ( ), NBr P  is obviously greater than 
. Where well-informed voters cannot distinguish the type of incumbent we 
assume that the expressive payoff remains as it was in section 2. Including morality as 
an expressive benefit brings the analysis of expressive behaviour in this paper to be 
much more in line with the approach taken by Brennan and Hamlin (1999). To 
simplify matters we set the welfare associated with a bad incumbent who prefers to 
extract rents at 0. With this we can see that the trade-off in scenario 1 in section 2 is 
now more easily fulfilled. Equations (2), (3) and (4) are re-written as follows 
( ,r P B)
 ( ) ( ),i S Sr P NB h W+  (13) 
 ( )( )* 1b bh W Wπ π κ+ − − S  (14) 
 ( ) ( )( )*,i S b S Sr P NB h W W Wπ> − −κ  (15) 
where we adjust π  to become bπ  to signify that bad politicians are now included 
such that bπ π≥ . So where a populist incumbent would win when the good politician 
separated from them when there were no bad politicians, the populist would certainly 
win when rent-extracting bad politicians are included in the analysis. Clearly scenario 
3 in section 2 where populists and good politicians pool is also more easily fulfilled, 
since the expressive value of the incumbent increases and there is now a  
probability that the challenger is bad. In this case, unanimous support is guaranteed. 
κ
 We now focus on whether scenario 2 in section 2 can be overturned. Given the 
potential existence of bad politicians is it possible for a good politician to implement 
*P  in period 1 and win the election. First note that the 1 ω−  rationally irrational 
voters will vote for the challenger as the good policy fails to meet their benchmark as 
in (1).12 So to win the election implementing good policy, the good politician will 
need to win1 2ω  of the informed voters. The payoff to voting for the incumbent is 
given by  
 ( ) ( )*,ir P NB h W+ *
                                                
 (16) 
 
12 We thus assume that the rationally irrational voters are unaware that provision of populist and good 
policy also entails a signal of moral integrity, as this would require them to be well enough informed to 
understand that a bad politician would extract rents in period 1. 
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and the payoff to voting for the challenger is given by (14). Although (16) is reduced 
in value compared to (5) because  is even further from , the effect of NB is to 
increase the value of (16) compared to (5). It is ambiguous as to whether (16) is 
greater in value than (5). It is unambiguous that (14) is lower in value than (3) 
because 
*P SP
bπ π≤  and .  The sign in (6) will be reversed if  0κ >
 ( ) ( )( )( )*, 1 b S Sr P NB h W W Wπ> − − −* κ  (17) 
for at least 1 2ω  of the informed voters. This is more likely the smaller is 
bπ , the 
larger is and significantly the higher is the expressive value of the incumbent 
demonstrating moral integrity. 
κ
 The satisfaction of (17) may paradoxically imply higher voter welfare than when 
there were no bad politicians as analysed in section 2. Assume that the good politician 
would pursue an informational strategy to win the election when there are no bad 
politicians, but now they can pursue a good policy and win the election when there are 
bad politicians. Voter welfare will now equal  
 ( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
1
1
1
b b S
b b S
b b
W W
W W
W W
π π κπ π κ β κπ κ π κ
⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟+ − − + ⎜ ⎟+ + − −⎝ ⎠S
 (18) 
and voter welfare will now be ex ante higher if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
* *
*
*
1
1 1
11
b b S
b b S I S
Sb b S
W W W
W W W W
WW W
π π κ ππ π κ β π π β πκπ κ π κ
⎛ ⎞+ − − ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+ − − + > + − + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + −+ + − − ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
which reduces to 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) (* 1 1 1S b I S SW W W W W )π β κ βπ π κ βκ− + + − > − + +  (19) 
(19) is more likely to hold the larger bπ , the greater is ( )* SW W− and the closer  
is to .
IW
SW 13 This creates a variation on the debate as to whether there might actually be 
some benefit arising from the existence of corruption, such as the familiar contention 
that ‘a little bit of corruption grease the wheels’ (see Aidt (2003) for a discussion). In 
this paper, ‘a little bit of potential corruption may improve voter welfare.’ Well-
informed voters who are not expressively drawn to  are, however, expressively 
drawn to the moral integrity of the good incumbent. In addition, they know that voting 
*P
                                                 
13 Note that if the good politician had selected populism in a world without bad politicians than the 
right hand side of (19) would be lower in value as ( )I SW Wπ −  would be removed. 
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for the challenger brings a h risk of bad policy in period 2 so there is greater 
instrumental benefit in voting for a good incumbent. This potentially frees the good 
incumbent from having to implement policies other than the optimal one to be re-
elected and by implementing good policy can appeal directly to the well-informed 
voters both expressively and instrumentally.
κ
14 We gather the results of this section in 
the following proposition 
 
Proposition 3 In a world with bad politicians where (12) holds such that κ
1
ET β β> − , a good incumbent who would otherwise lose an election pursuing good  
policy in a world with no bad politicians because (6) holds, would now win the 
election if (17) holds. Welfare will be higher in a world with bad politicians in 
comparison with one without bad politicians if (19) holds.  
  
3.2 The bad politician prefers to win the election and extract rents in period 2 
In the following it is assumed that (6), (15) and (17) hold and that the sign in (12) is 
now reversed. First, we demonstrate that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium with 
all three types choosing . Given the assumption that (17) holds then we know that 
it is the case that the good politician can win the election by deviating and 
choosing  which is obviously preferable to winning the election by choosing . 
We can also demonstrate that there is no pooling equilibrium where all three types 
choose . In this case the payoff for voting for the incumbent would be  
SP
*P
*
SP
P
 ( ) ( )( )* * 1i b bh W Wπ π κ+ + − − Sr P  (20) 
and (14) for the challenger, where it is noted that the moral expressive value in voting 
for the incumbent  is absent because a bad politician would pool with the other two 
types. The challenger will win if  
 ( )*0 r P>  (21) 
We know that (21) holds because (6) is assumed to hold.  
 So a pooling equilibrium for all three types is not possible given the conditions 
previously derived in the model. Is an equilibrium possible where the populist and bad 
                                                 
14 In a recent paper Lupia and Menning (2009) ask ‘When can politicians scare citizens into supporting 
bad policies?’ In contrast, this paper asks the question ‘When can fear of bad politicians scare citizens 
into supporting good policies?’ 
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politicians pool on  and the good politician chooses ? The payoffs to voting for 
the incumbent (which could be populist or bad) is  
SP *P
 ( ) 1 1
b
i S S
br P h W
π κ
π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −+ ⎜ ⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎟⎟⎟
 (22) 
and the payoff to voting for the challenger is (14). For  to be an election winning 
strategy for the pooling populist and bad types, the following must hold for 
SP
1 2ω
ω
−  
of the well-informed voters 
 ( ) * 1 1
b
i S b S
br P h W W
π κπ π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −> −⎜ ⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎟⎟⎟
 (23) 
although bπ π≤ , (23) is potentially more restrictive than (4) because of the presence 
of on the right-hand side of (23), so while it is consistent with the model for the bad 
and populist politicians to pool and the good politician to separate we will also 
consider the case where (23) fails to hold for at least 
κ
1 2ω
ω
−  of the well-informed 
voters. 
 If (23) does not hold, it immediately follows that an equilibrium where the bad 
politician does not pool with the populist and chooses  cannot exist because SP
1
1
b
S
bh W
π κ
π
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎜⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎟⎟⎟
 would be deducted from (22). So bad politicians will want to 
pool. Could they pool with a good politician and win? The payoff in this case for 
voting for the incumbent would be 
 ( ) ** bb Wr P h ππ κ⎛ ⎞+ ⎜ +⎝ ⎠⎟  (24) 
and as usual for the challenger the payoff would be (14).  The challenger would win if  
 ( ) ( ) ** 1 bb S b Wr P h W ππ κ π κ⎛< − − −⎜ +⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟  (25) 
Given that (6) tells us that there are at least 1 21 ω−  of well-informed voters with 
negative expressive utility for any deviation from  and that the deviation from  
in (25) is larger than in (6) then (25) holds automatically.  
SP SP
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 So given (17), (21) and (25) holding and (23) not holding a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium will not exist. In section 3, however, we have up to this point ignored the 
potential role of information provision. Potentially there could be an equilibrium 
whereby the good and populist politicians signal their integrity by providing 
information up to a level at which the bad politician would not be willing. For this to 
be the case the following conditions are required for the good, populist and bad 
politicians 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )* * * 1I bE W C I E W E W W Wβ β π π+ − + + > + + + − −b Sκ  (26) 
 ( )E C I E Eβ− + >  (27) 
 ( ) ( )E C I T E T Eβ− + + ≤ +  (28) 
and simplifying 
 ( )( )* *( ) 1I b SE C I W W W W Wβ β π− > − − − − − Sκ  (29) 
 ( ) 0E C Iβ − >  (30) 
 ( )( ) 1E C I Tβ β− ≤ −  (31) 
So an equilibrium could exist with the good and populist politicians providing at least 
(1E T )β β− −  of information in period 1, providing welfare  and winning 
the election. The bad politician extracts rents in period 1 and loses the election. What 
are the implications of information provision in this case? Earlier when it was 
assumed that there were no bad politicians, the motivation to provide information 
only existed for good politicians as a way to improve policy in period 1 and where it 
was clear that such a strategy would win the election. Now the motivation is rather 
different. The good and bad politicians may find that this is the only way they can 
distinguish themselves from bad politicians and thus guarantee election victory. So in 
addition to improving policy in period 1 (not a motivation for the populist) there is 
now the motivation to prove integrity (a motivation for both politicians). At the risk of 
stretching this result too far, this might also offer a partial explanation for the 
existence of ‘overactive’ government where information provision and reform are in 
constant abundance. Apart from a negative interpretation that such action is purely for 
self-advertising or a positive interpretation that it is done to improve government 
policy, this section provides a further positive reason that voters may interpret such 
*IW W≤
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behaviour as, at least, providing evidence that the incumbent is not bad if they are 
willing to make such efforts to engage with voters. 
 We can sum up the two equilibria identified in this subsection in the following 
proposition 
Proposition 4: Suppose (12) fails to hold so that
1
E Tβ β ≥− . A partially separating 
equilibrium exists where the bad and populist incumbents choose and the good 
incumbent chooses if (23) holds. If (23) fails to hold, a partially separating 
equilibrium may exist where the good and populist politicians provide information 
C(I) and policy P(I) so that 
SP
*P
( )
1 1
E C IE T
ββ
β β
−> ≥− −  and the bad incumbent chooses to 
extract rents. 
  
Welfare in the two equilibria identified in Proposition 4 are as follows 
 ( ) ( )( )* *1 1b b S b bW W Wπ π β π π κ+ − + + − − SW  (32) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )* *1 1 1I b b I b bW W W W k k Wκ β π π κ κπ π− + + − − + + − − S
                                                
 (33) 
Simple inspection of (18), (32) and (33) tell us that there is no straightforward welfare 
ranking of equilibria in a world with bad politicians. It thus follows that the 
conclusion at the end of section 3.1 still holds in a world where bad politicians would 
ideally wish to delay rent extraction. A little bit of potential corruption may improve 
voter welfare. 
 
3.3. Fiscal Restraints and Term Limits 
The results of sections 3.1 and 3.2 may feed into the debate regarding the appropriate 
level of fiscal restraints that should be placed upon government. If we allow T to be 
endogenised, it could be set at a high level so that (12) holds and bad politicians 
would prefer to extract rents in period 1. Alternatively, T could be set low so that (12) 
fails to hold and bad politicians would prefer to delay rent extraction until period 2. 15 
 
15 Note that in any discussion regarding altering the level of tax we obviously cannot assume the same 
levels of welfare as before the change. Reducing tax reduces public spending but that must be set 
against the welfare generated by higher private spending. If policy had been set optimally a reduction 
in tax would reduce welfare, but if policy had been populist reducing tax may well increase welfare and 
welfare would certainly increase compared to a policy of rent extraction by a bad politician. Given that 
these forces are offsetting we simplify matters by setting this issue to the side in the brief discussion of 
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The classic discussion of fiscal restraints is presented in Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980). They argue that because elections are a highly imperfect disciplining device, 
fiscal restraints may be required to bind the hands of Leviathan. Besley and Smart 
(2007) use a political agency model, which includes both bad and good politicians, to 
explore this issue and find that the effect of fiscal restraints is ambiguous. It depends 
upon the proportion of bad politicians. They find that lowering tax increases the 
incentive of bad politicians to pool, which improves discipline and is thus a good idea 
when the proportion of bad politicians is high. This is in line with the public choice 
approach of Brennan and Buchanan where fiscal restraints are recommended in a 
world where there are only bad politicians. On the other hand, increasing tax would 
more likely lead to a separating equilibrium and this is good for welfare when the 
selection effect dominates such that the proportion of bad politicians is low. 
 By comparing (18) with (32) and (33) we can ask similar questions. If (32) and 
(33) are greater than (18) the recommendation is to set T at a lower level so that (12) 
does not hold. Welfare in (32) will be higher than in (18) if the improved welfare in 
period 1 compensates for reduced welfare in period 2 and this is more likely the 
higher the value of . However, higher values of κ κ are also more likely to lead to 
(23) not holding and this may give rise to the second type of equilibrium generating 
welfare (33). Welfare in (33) will be higher than in (18) if high levels of welfare can 
be achieved through information provision. The more striking result, however, is that 
it may be better for voter welfare to allow the possibility of high rent extraction by 
bad politicians because when is low (18) may be greater than (32) or when is 
relatively large the level of W  generated in equilibrium may not be much higher than 
 and substantially less than . 
κ
I
W
κ
SW *
 Note that, in this analysis, whether to recommend hard or soft fiscal restraints 
would not only be linked to whether the proportion of bad politicians is high or low. It 
could be that  is relatively large but because information provision is unlikely to be 
successful it may be better to set soft fiscal restraints which by causing bad politicians 
to extract rent in period 1 allows good politicians to implement optimal policy and be 
re-elected. 
κ
 Finally the results of sections 2 and 3 provide potentially very different verdicts on 
term limits. In section 2, one period is preferable to two periods. To see this note that 
                                                                                                                                            
fiscal restraints in this paper. A more in depth analysis of fiscal restraints and voter welfare in a model 
of heterogeneous political agents would require much closer attention to this issue. 
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the ex ante social payoff from such a rule would be 
( ) ( )(* *1 1SW W Wπ π β π π+ − + + − )SW . This is greater than the payoffs from either 
the good or informational polices in section 2. Once bad politicians are introduced 
then the optimal term limit may be longer than one period as (18) and (32) are 
unambiguously greater than ( ) ( )( )* *1 1b b S b bW W W Wκ β π π κ− + + − − S
                                                
π π+ − .16 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
In a two period political agency model with good, populist and bad politicians, and 
rationally irrational and expressive voters we first identified political equilibria in a 
setting with no bad politicians. We found that populism may exist as a political 
equilibrium despite it being unambiguously inferior for welfare compared to a 
strategy where the good politician implements optimal policy but is not re-elected. On 
the other hand we found that a strategy of information provision may improve welfare 
compared to the 1st period pursuit of best policy. We introduced bad politicians into 
the analysis, considering both where they would prefer to extract rents in period 1 and 
where they would ideally prefer to delay rent extraction until period 2. A key finding 
in the paper is that under both scenarios welfare may be higher than when there are no 
bad politicians such that a little bit of potential corruption could improve welfare. 
Finally, we used the results of the model to consider the debate as to whether fiscal 
restraints should be soft or hard. Here we confirmed previous findings that a high 
proportion of bad politicians would suggest the superiority of hard restraints, but, in 
contrast we also found that soft restraints may be preferable even when there are a 
high proportion of bad politicians. This could happen when information provision is 
unlikely to lead to significantly higher levels of welfare. 
 There are issues raised in this paper that future work might address. First, as 
discussed in footnote 15 a more detailed discussion of altering tax revenues would 
require a more precise analysis of welfare given that reduced/increased tax and public 
spending implies increased/reduced private spending. The issue of term limits was 
only briefly addressed and would merit closer attention. Term limits and fiscal 
restraints are issues in institutional design. Further issues in institutional design that 
the paper has not addressed are whether the scope of democracy should be reduced so 
 
16 The issue of the optimal term limit is analyzed in Smart and Sturm (2006). 
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that more decisions are made by independent committees of experts and whether 
voting should be compulsory (or at least more vigorously encouraged) or optional. If 
non-voting is positively correlated with being uninformed committees would seem 
more necessary the higher the turnout and likewise a potential advantage of low 
turnouts is that the quality of voting may be higher thus reducing the need to delegate 
policy to expert committees. At least three objections may be levelled at the idea that 
either committees or small turnouts are preferable to large-scale turnout in elections 
with wide scope for determining policy. First, the familiar concern regarding the 
accountability of the expert committees would arise. Second, if it is the case that 
democratic participation increases knowledge (even to a small extent) of the 
economic and political issues that are to be determined by the election then there may 
be a cost to civil society in reducing the scope for which issues would be decided by 
the election and instead transferred to a committee. Third, the paper has considered 
only efficiency issues. If it is also the case that there is a positive correlation between 
non-voting and socioeconomic background then there are distributional implications 
involved in non-voting. It could be argued that we should encourage large turnouts 
because failure to vote by certain groups may lead to welfare losses for disadvantaged 
groups which may not be compensated for by the higher quality of voting on 
efficiency issues.  
 Clearly, a richer depiction of the behaviour of voters exists here than in previous 
political agency models. This set-up allows a focus on populism as driven by 
uninformed bias (which could potentially be altered with information provision) and 
informed bias with hard expressive preferences. This means that populism in this 
paper is very different (and we would argue more true to its nature) than the depiction 
of populism in the existing political agency papers. This analysis also echoes the point 
made by Caplan (2007) that a neglected but fairly obvious argument for the existence 
of political inefficiency exists. Explanations usually focus on the strategic interaction 
of special interest politics and in ways that can become complicated because voters 
are assumed to be fully informed and instrumentally rational. Once, we drop this 
assumption, a simple explanation for the existence of inefficiency is that voters might 
choose inefficient policies because they are emotionally drawn towards them and 
emotional appeals can dominate in electoral settings for the rational reason that the 
likelihood of being decisive in determining the outcome of most elections is very 
small.  
 30
 References 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “Inefficient redistribution.” 
 American Political Science Review 95: 649-661. 
Aidt, Toke. 2003. “Economic analysis of corruption: A survey.” The Economic 
 Journal 113: F632-F652. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. “A positive theory of fiscal deficits and 
 government debt.” Review of Economic Studies 57: 403-414.   
Besley, Timothy. 2006. Principled agents: The political economy of good 
 government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Besley, Timothy and Michael Smart. 2007. “Fiscal restraints and voter welfare.” 
 Journal of Public Economics 91: 755-773. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and Alan.Hamlin. 1998. “Expressive voting and electoral 
 equilibrium.” Public Choice 95: 149-175. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. 1980. The power to tax: Analytical  
 foundations of the fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and Alan.Hamlin. 1999. “On political representation.” British 
 Journal of Political Science,  29: 109-27. 
Brennan, Geoffrey,  and Loren Lomasky. 1993. Democracy and decision. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
Canovan, Margaret. 1999. “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of 
 democracy.” Political Studies 47: 2-16. 
Canes-Wrone, Bandice, Michael C. Herron and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2001. 
 “Leadership and pandering: A theory of executive policymaking.” American 
 Journal of Political Science 45: 532-550. 
Caplan, Bryan. 2002. “Systematically biased beliefs about economics: Robust 
 evidence of judgemental anomalies from the survey of Americans and Economists 
 on the economy.” The Economic Journal 112, 433-458. 
Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad  
policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Coate, Stephen, and Stephen Morris. 1995. “On the form of transfers to special 
 interests.” Journal of Political Economy 103: 1210-1235. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and 
 Row. 
 31
 32
Lupia, Arthur, and Jesse Menning. 2009. “When can politicians scare citizens into 
 supporting bad policies?” American Journal of Political Science 53: 90-106. 
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. “The politician and the judge: Accountability in 
 government.” American Economic Review 94: 1034-1054. 
Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik. 2003. “Why are some people (and countries) 
 more protectionist than others.” European Economic Review 49: 1393-1430. 
Morris, Stephen. 2001. “Political correctness.” Journal of Political Economy 109: 
 231-267. 
Persson, Torsten, and Lars Svensson. 1989. “Why a stubborn conservative would run 
 a   deficit: Policy with time-inconsistency preferences.” Quarterly Journal of 
 Economics 104: 325-345. 
Robinson, James A. 1998. “Theories of ‘bad policy’.” Journal of Policy Reform 3: 1-
 46. 
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “Understanding economic policy reform.” Journal of Economic 
 Literature 34: 9-41. 
Romer, David. 2003. “Misconceptions and political outcomes.” The Economic 
 Journal  113: 1-20. 
Smart, Michael, and Daniel M. Sturm. 2006. “Term limits and electoral 
 accountability,” typescript. University of Munich  
Tullock, Gordon. 1983. Economics of income redistribution. Boston: Kluwer-
 Nijhoff. 
Westen, Drew. 2007. The political brain: The role of emotion in deciding the fate of 
 the nation. New York: Public Affairs. 
Wittman, Donald. 1989. “Why democracies produce efficient results.” Journal of 
 Political Economy 97: 1395-1424. 
Wittman, Donald. 1995. The myth of democratic failure: Why political institutions  
are efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
